Paying Off Populism: How Regional Policies Affect Voting Behavior

Robert Gold and Jakob Lehr

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: This paper shows that regional policies can decrease populist support. We focus on the "development objective" ("Objective-1") of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), meant to support lagging-behind regions. For causal inference, we exploit three sources of quasi-exogenous variation in a Regression-Discontinuity-Design (RDD), a Difference-in- Differences framework (DiD), and with matching techniques. Using NUTS3-level panel data on the outcomes of elections to the EU parliament, observed over the period 1999-2019, we consistently find that Objective-1 transfers reduces the vote share of right-fringe parties by about 2.5 pp. Left-fringe party support is not affected. Complementary analyses of individual-level survey data from the Eurobarometer show that the European Union’s regional policy increases trust in democratic institutions and decreases discontent with the EU.

Keywords: Populism; Regional Policies; European Integration; Regression Discontinuity Design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H54 R11 R58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47
Date: 2025-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-eec, nep-geo, nep-pol and nep-soc
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