Performance of Procrastinators: On the Value of Deadlines
Fabian Herweg and
Daniel Müller
No 3/2008, Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Abstract:
Earlier work has shown that procrastination can be explained by quasi-hyperbolic discounting. We present a model of effort choice over time that shifts the focus away from completion to performance on a single task. We show that quasi-hyperbolic discounting is detrimental for performance. More intrestingly, we find that being aware of the own self-control problems not necessarily increases performance. Extending this framework to a multi-task model, we show that deadlines help an agent to structure his workload more efficiently, which in turn leads to better performance. Moreover, being restricted by deadlines increases a quasi-hyperbolic discounter's well-being. Thus, we give a theoretical underpinning for recent empirical evidence and numerous casual observations.
Keywords: Effort Choice; Deadlines; (Quasi-) Hyperbolic Discounting; Naiveté; Present-Biased Preferences; Sophistication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 D11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Performance of procrastinators: on the value of deadlines (2011) 
Working Paper: Performance of procrastinators: On the value of deadlines (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bonedp:32008
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