Deterring Illegal Entry: Migrant Sanctions and Recidivism in Border Apprehensions

Samuel Bazzi, Sarah Burns (), Gordon Hanson, Bryan Roberts () and John Whitley ()
Additional contact information
Sarah Burns: Institute for Defense Analyses
Bryan Roberts: Institute for Defense Analyses
John Whitley: Institute for Defense Analyses

No dp-329, Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics

Abstract: Over 2008 to 2012, the U.S. Border Patrol enacted new sanctions on migrants apprehended attempting to enter the U.S. illegally. Using administrative records on apprehensions of Mexican nationals that include ngerprint-based IDs and other details, we detect if an apprehended migrant is subject to penalties and if he is later re-apprehended. Exploiting plausibly random variation in the roll-out of sanctions, we estimate econometrically that exposure to penalties reduced the 18-month re-apprehension rate for males by 4.6 to 6.1 percentage points off of a baseline rate of 24.2%. These magnitudes imply that sanctions can account for 28 to 44 percent of the observed decline in recidivism in apprehensions. Further results suggest that the drop in recidivism was associated with a reduction in attempted illegal entry.

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Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2019-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Deterring Illegal Entry: Migrant Sanctions and Recidivism in Border Apprehensions (2021)
Working Paper: Deterring Illegal Entry: Migrant Sanctions and Recidivism in Border Apprehensions (2018)
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