Non-Financial Reporting & Corporate Governance: Explaining American Divergence & Its Implications for Disclosure Reform

Harper Ho Virginia ()
Additional contact information
Harper Ho Virginia: University of Kansas School of Law, 1535 W. 15 St, Lawrence, KS 66045, USA

Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, 2020, vol. 10, issue 2, 29

Abstract: Non-financial reporting reforms have moved ahead around the world as governments work to advance sustainable development and improve environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) risk management by firms and investors In the United States, however, non-financial reporting reforms face resistance and have lagged behind. This article offers an overview of the state of non-financial reporting in the U.S. and explains why the U.S. approach still diverges so visibly from the reform path adopted by other governments around the world. It then suggests potential directions for non-financial disclosure reform that take account of the U.S. institutional context. The article concludes by considering the implications of the United States’ market-driven approach for non-financial reporting reform and for the future of sustainable finance more broadly.

Keywords: securities law; corporate governance; disclosure; ESG; non-financial; reporting; path dependency; private ordering; shareholder primacy; shareholder wealth maximization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K22 M14 M38 M48 N2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2018-0043 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:aelcon:v:10:y:2020:i:2:p:29:n:3

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/ael/html

DOI: 10.1515/ael-2018-0043

Access Statistics for this article

Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium is currently edited by Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Yuri Biondi and Shyam Sunder

More articles in Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().