EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Being Done With Milton Friedman

Robé Jean-Philippe
Additional contact information
Robé Jean-Philippe: Ecole de droit de Sciences Po, Paris

Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, 2012, vol. 2, issue 2, 33

Abstract: In an article of just under 3,000 words, published on September 19, 1970 in The New York Times under the title The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, Milton Friedman strongly expressed a simple idea, summarized in its title, which quickly took off as a statement of the obvious.This article has achieved the wonder of making appear as obviously true inferences about the role of the firm and its executives which, in fact, are based on erroneous assertions. Friedman’s argument, in particular, is based on the claim that shareholders own the firm. This is totally false, as our article will show. But based on this assertion, the argument has been built that corporate executives are the shareholders’ agents, that they must maximize the shareholders’ interests -equated with a maximization of the profits- and that they should not pay attention to anything else and especially not to the impact the pursuit of this goal may have on other contributors to the firm or on its social and natural environments.

Keywords: business entity; business enterprise; corporation; corporate social responsibility; corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/2152-2820.1047 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:aelcon:v:2:y:2012:i:2:n:3

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/ael/html

DOI: 10.1515/2152-2820.1047

Access Statistics for this article

Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium is currently edited by Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Yuri Biondi and Shyam Sunder

More articles in Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:bpj:aelcon:v:2:y:2012:i:2:n:3