Dentsū Changed Nothing: Reexamining Karoshi in Japan Through Shavell's Insights on the Incentives to Prevent Accidents

McGuire Robert
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McGuire Robert: Duke University School of Law

Asian Journal of Law and Economics, 2012, vol. 3, issue 1, 30

Abstract: Ten years after the Japanese Supreme Court established a duty of care for employers to guard employee health, incidents of death by overwork remain critically high. This Note argues that the Dentsū standard of near-strict employer liability does not create sufficient incentives to prevent karoshi. Applying Steven Shavell’s insight that a victim who knows his injurer will be liable for damages will not be incentivized by the law to prevent the harm, the Note explains why neither employees nor the employers responded to Dentsū. It concludes that Dentsū is correctly understood as cause of action in tort for survivors of karoshi victims, not a vehicle to change the Japanese workplace.

Keywords: Japan; Shavell; karoshi; karo jisatsu; law and economics; liability regimes; suicide (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1515/2154-4611.1062

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