On-the-Job Search and Finding a Good Job Through Social Contacts

Gergely Horvath

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2014, vol. 14, issue 1, 93-125

Abstract: The interactions between on-the-job search and finding a job through social contacts are investigated in a Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides search model with heterogeneous wages. Workers may find a job through their social contacts and on the formal market. The presence of social contacts increases the overall welfare in society as it rises the number of workers earning high wages and decreases the unemployment rate. However, unemployed workers finding a job through social ties earn lower wages on average than those who obtain a job on the formal market. This result follows from on-the-job search: employed workers pass only those offers on to their neighbors that pay (weakly) lower wages than their current wages earned. Despite the wage discount, unemployed workers still might find it beneficial to search via social ties because arrival rate of offers is higher for this channel than for the formal market when the number of neighbors is sufficiently large. There is a trade-off between unemployment duration and wages earned for workers obtaining a job via social ties.

Keywords: social networks; labor market search; wages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D85 E24 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2013-0033

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