Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

George Mailath, Steven Matthews () and Tadashi Sekiguchi

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2002, vol. 2, issue 1, 23

Abstract: We present three examples of finitely repeated games with public monitoring that have sequential equilibria in private strategies, i.e., strategies that depend on own past actions as well as public signals. Such private sequential equilibria can have features quite unlike those of the more familiar perfect public equilibria: (i) making a public signal less informative can create Pareto superior equilibrium outcomes; (ii) the equilibrium final-period action profile need not be a stage game equilibrium; and (iii) even if the stage game has a unique correlated (and hence Nash) equilibrium, the first-period action profile need not be a stage game equilibrium.

Keywords: Private strategies; repeated games; public perfect equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1046

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