Signal Jamming in Games with Multiple Senders

Jeong-Yoo Kim

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2003, vol. 3, issue 1, 20

Abstract: This paper investigates the possibility of signal jamming in games with multiple informed parties whose interests are conflicting. The possibility that signal jamming occurs in equilibrium depends on the observability of individual signals. Paradoxically, if the receiver can observe individual signals perfectly, signal jamming can occur in equilibrium, while it cannot occur if the receiver can observe only the one-dimensional signal synthesized from the senders' individual actions.

Keywords: signal jamming; signaling games; multiple senders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1080

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