Patent Renewal Fees and Self-Funding Patent Offices

Joshua Gans, Stephen King and Lampe Ryan
Additional contact information
Lampe Ryan: Stanford University, rlampe@stanford.edu

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2004, vol. 4, issue 1, 15

Abstract: A socially optimal structure of application and renewal fees for patents would encourage the maximal number of applications while reducing effective patent length. We find, however, that when patent offices are required to be self-funding, resource constraints can distort this fee structure. Specifically, a financially constrained, but welfare-oriented, patent office will tend to raise initial application fees while lowering renewal fees. This creates two detriments to social welfare as it discourages the filing of some patents while extending the effective life of others.

Keywords: patents; renewal fees; self-funding; innovation incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1147

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