When Do Firms Prefer Individual Action to Collective Action in The Pursuit of Corporate Political Strategy? A New Perspective on Industry Concentration

Ozer Mine and Lee Seung-Hyun
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Ozer Mine: SUNY Oneonta
Lee Seung-Hyun: University of Texas at Dallas

Business and Politics, 2009, vol. 11, issue 1, 1-23

Abstract: In this study we advance the current research on corporate political strategy by examining how firms decide on their level of engagement in political action. This study proposes a contingency approach that identifies conditions in which firms prefer individual action to collective action in their pursuit of political strategy and introduces a framework that addresses this preference. Our results show that even in concentrated industries, a firm's preference of individual action over collective action varies when government contracts or research and development intensity are important considerations.

Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.2202/1469-3569.1234

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