The Mandatory Bid Rule in the Takeover Directive: Harmonization Without Foundation?

Enriques Luca
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Enriques Luca: * Professor of Business Law, University of Bologna and ECGI Research Associate. E-mail address: luca.enriques@unibo.it

European Company and Financial Law Review, 2004, vol. 1, issue 4, 440-457

Abstract: The following article critically evaluates the mandatory bid rule in the new Takeover Directive. It questions the rationale and the effectiveness of this central feature in light of the wide discretion left to the Member States, in particular regarding the permissibility of defensive measures, and ends with provocative views on “cui bono?”.

Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1515/ecfr.2004.1.4.440

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