Empowering the ECB to Supervise Banks: A Choice-Based Approach
Hertig Gerard,
Lee Ruben and
McCahery Joseph A.
Additional contact information
Hertig Gerard: *ETH Zürich and ECGI.
Lee Ruben: **Oxford Finance Group.
McCahery Joseph A.: ***University of Amsterdam, Tilburg University and ECGI.
European Company and Financial Law Review, 2010, vol. 7, issue 2, 171-215
Abstract:
The reform of bank supervision represents a significant institutional challenge for the European Union. This paper explores the merits of a choice-oriented approach under which individual Member states have the option to delegate prudential supervision of their largest banks to the European Central Bank, while retaining the right to re-assume such a role at a later date. Responsibilities, commitments and costs would be allocated by means of a binding arrangement with the ECB that can be tailored to Member states' specific circumstances. The proposal offered here is superior to both existing supervisory arrangements and proposed alternatives. Its adoption would also significantly reinforce the new, post financial crisis EU supervisory architecture.
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)
Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/ecfr.2010.171 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:eucflr:v:7:y:2010:i:2:p:171-215:n:2
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/ecfr/html
DOI: 10.1515/ecfr.2010.171
Access Statistics for this article
European Company and Financial Law Review is currently edited by Heribert Hirte
More articles in European Company and Financial Law Review from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().