Reforming Executive Compensation: Simplicity, Transparency and Committing to the Long-term

Bhagat Sanjai and Romano Roberta
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Bhagat Sanjai: *Professor of Finance, University of Colorado.
Romano Roberta: **Oscar M. Ruebhausen Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research; Research Fellow, European Corporate Governance Institute.

European Company and Financial Law Review, 2010, vol. 7, issue 2, 273-296

Abstract: This Article advances an executive compensation reform proposal that is specifically addressed to firms receiving government financial assistance and thought to pose a systemic risk, although we think that all firms should consider its adoption. Executive compensation reform should lead to policies that are simple, transparent, and focused on creating and sustaining long-term shareholder value. With these criteria in mind, we suggest that incentive compensation plans should consist only of restricted stock and restricted stock options, restricted in the sense that the shares cannot be sold nor the options exercised for a period of at least two to four years after an individual resignation or last day in office. We would permit a modest amount to be paid out to executives currently to address tax, liquidity, and premature turnover concerns that the proposal could induce. We believe that this approach will provide superior incentives for executives (and traders whose actions can substantially impact an organization) to manage firms in investors longer-term interest, and diminish their incentive to make public statements, manage earnings, or accept undue levels of risk, for the sake of short-term price appreciation. By reducing managerial incentives to take on unwarranted risk, our proposal would therefore also decrease the probability that public resources will be dissipated in bailouts of financial firms, particularly those deemed by public officials as “too big to fail.”

Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1515/ecfr.2010.273

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