Why Official Bailouts Tend Not To Work: An Example Motivated by Greece 2010

Chamley Christophe P and Pinto Brian
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Chamley Christophe P: Boston University
Pinto Brian: World Bank

The Economists' Voice, 2011, vol. 8, issue 1, 5

Abstract: Christophe Chamley of Boston University and Brian Pinto of the World Bank use recent events in Greece to illustrate that official bailouts tend not to work when countries have fundamental fiscal ('insolvency') problems and construct a two-period numerical example to explain why this should not come as a surprise.

Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.2202/1553-3832.1821

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