Nash Implementation in Rationing Problems with Single-Crossing Preferences

Ahmed Doghmi ()

Mathematical Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 1, issue 2-4, 69-74

Abstract: In this paper we study the rationing problems in using the issue of Nash implementation in an environment of single-crossing preferences. We show that strict monotonicity (i) implies strict weak no-veto power and unanimity and (ii) is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity, which is vacuously checked in this domain. We show that any social choice correspondence that has full range can be implemented in Nash equilibria.

Keywords: Nash implementation; Rationing problem; Single-crossing preferences; Nash implementation; Rationing problem; Single-crossing preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1515/mel-2013-0019

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