Mathematical Foci

Romar Correa

Mathematical Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 2, issue 1-2, 5-11

Abstract: We address the converse of a Wald–Vorob'ev theorem. In a non cooperative game, if the strategy set of any individual player is precompact, we show that the strategy sets of all the other players is precompact.

Keywords: Multiple Equilibria; Leadership; Multiple Equilibria; Leadership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B32 C60 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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DOI: 10.1515/mel-2013-0008

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