Die Unabhängigkeit von Kartellbehörden
Duijm Bernhard
ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1999, vol. 50, issue 1, 323-344
Abstract:
In the last few years national competition authorities in many industrial, developing, and transformation economies have gained more independence. There is a strong probability that politically independent competition authorities persue a more competition- based approach in applying anti-trust laws than governments do. The article discusses various aspects of independence and shows how some forms of independence have been realized in several countries. The degree of independence is not only determined by the institutional design of the authority, but is also influenced by many other factors, inter alia the scope of competition law, the number of goals the authority has to persue, and the role of sectoral authorities. Independent authorities may be more inclined to cooperate in international competition cases. Furthermore, a system of independent national competition authorities may facilitate a decentralized application of EC competition rules.
Date: 1999
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DOI: 10.1515/ordo-1999-0120
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