Ocean Shipping Cartels: A Survey

William Sjostrom ()

Review of Network Economics, 2004, vol. 3, issue 2, 28

Abstract: Liner shipping has been characterized by collusive agreements, called shipping conferences, since its founding in the mid-nineteenth century. This article surveys the competing models of shipping conferences, including monopolizing cartels and destructive competition models, and reviews a variety of their practices to see how much light they can shed on the profitability and efficiency of conferences.

Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1046

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