The Belt and Road Initiative: Are China’s Investments Sensitive to the Quality of Governance in a Host Country?

Xinge Ruan () and Nader Habibi ()
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Xinge Ruan: Brandeis University
Nader Habibi: Brandeis University

No 134, Working Papers from Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Business School

Abstract: This article uses statistical analysis to explore the correlation between the quality of governance in a host country and the size and nature of China’s investments in that country, based on the available data for 2005-2020. We focus on two types of Chinese economic engagements with each host country: direct investment by Chinese firms and the volume of service contracts awarded to Chinese firms for construction projects. Overall, our statistical analysis demonstrates that China’s direct investments and service contracts both show significant correlations with the governance characteristics of the host country. At the same time, we observe a large degree of diversity in the significance of specific governance indicators across regions and economic sectors. The Regulation Quality indicator, for example, has a strong positive correlation with total investment and total service contract, but the significance is lost when the sample is restricted to the Middle East or South Asia. The most intriguing finding of our research is that in some sectors, the correlation between governance indicators and China's direct investments and service contracts varies significantly. The Voice and Accountability indicator has a positive correlation with China's direct investments but a negative correlation with China's service contracts for the entire sample. This suggests that China is awarded more service contracts in less democratic countries of these regions. An alternative explanation is that Chinese firms prefer to invest directly in more democratic countries and operate as contractors in less democratic countries. Similarly, we find a positive correlation between the absence of corruption and China's service contracts, but no significant correlation with its direct investments.

Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2023-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna, nep-fdg, nep-int and nep-tra
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