Founders and Financially Affiliated Directors on Charter School Boards and Their Impact on Financial Performance and Academic Achievement

Charisse Gulosin (cag2022@columbia.edu) and Elif Sisli-Ciamarra (esisli@brandeis.edu)
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Charisse Gulosin: Columbia University
Elif Sisli-Ciamarra: International Business School, Brandeis University
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Elif Sisli Ciamarra

No 42, Working Papers from Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Business School

Abstract: This study uses a hand-collected dataset for charter school boards in Massachusetts between 2001 and 2009 to examine the relationship between financial performance and the presence of founders and financially affiliated directors. School-level financial performance suggests that founder presence on a board has a negative effect on both financial and academic performance of a charter school. On the other hand, the presence of financially affiliated directors on the charter school governing board is positively related to financial performance, but unrelated to academic achievement. The results are consistent with the literature on corporate and nonprofit boards that have attributed financially affiliated directors with greater incentives to monitor financial targets, while founders are less likely to achieve performance expectations.

Keywords: Charter schools; Board governance; Financial performance; Achievement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H75 I20 L29 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2012-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-lab and nep-ure
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http://www.brandeis.edu/economics/RePEc/brd/doc/Brandeis_WP42.pdf First version, 2012 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:brd:wpaper:42

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