Goal Bracketing and Self-Control

Alice Hsiaw

No 90, Working Papers from Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Business School

Abstract: This paper studies the role of goal bracketing to attenuate time inconsistency. When setting non-binding goals in multi-stage project, an agent must also decide how and when to evaluate himself against such goals. In particular, he can bracket broadly by setting an aggregate goal for the entire project, or narrowly by setting incremental goals for individual stages. In the presence of loss aversion and uncertainty over outcomes, this decision involves a trade-off between motivation and comparative disutility due to ex-ante uncertainty. Narrow goal bracketing can be used as an instrument to counteract the self-control problem, while broad goal bracketing can itself generate apparently erroneous behavior such as the sunk cost fallacy. The sequential nature of decision-making introduces a differential reaction to outcome uncertainty based on its timing, which determines the optimal bracketing choice.

Pages: 51 pages
Date: 2015-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-mic, nep-ppm and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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http://www.brandeis.edu/economics/RePEc/brd/doc/Brandeis_WP90.pdf First version, 2015 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Goal bracketing and self-control (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:brd:wpaper:90

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