Stability of collusion and quality differentiation- a Nash bargaining approach

Georgios Petropoulos, Thanos Athanasopoulos and Burak Dindaroglu

Bruegel Working Papers from Bruegel

Abstract: How do incentives to collude depend on how asymmetric firms are? For low levels of differentiation, an increase in quality difference makes collusion

Date: 2021-06
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