Reputation and Ownership of Public Goods

Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka and Evagelos Pafilis ()

The Centre for Market and Public Organisation from The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effect of reputation on ownership of public goods in the Besley and Ghatak (2001) model. We show that in the dynamic setup the optimal ownership depends not only on the relative valuations for the public good but also on technology (elasticity of investment). We also show that joint ownership of public good can be optimal in both the static and repeated game but it emerges for a different parameter range. Our results are applied to the case of return of cultural goods to their country of origin.

Keywords: public goods; property rights; reputation; joint ownership; cultural goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 H11 H41 L14 L33 Z1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2009-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/cmpo/publications/papers/2009/wp211.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.bristol.ac.uk/cmpo/publications/papers/2009/wp211.pdf [302 Moved Temporarily]--> https://www.bristol.ac.uk/cmpo/publications/papers/2009/wp211.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bri:cmpowp:09/211

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in The Centre for Market and Public Organisation from The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().