Patent Protection As A Stimulant for Risky Innovation. Could TRIPS be Counterproductive?

Andreas Panagopoulos ()

Bristol Economics Discussion Papers from School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK

Abstract: This paper introduces the idea that strong patent protection can lead innovators to rest on their laurels, into a simple tournament based framework. Concentrating on optimal patent protection, the one that maximizes production, the model shows that there is a positive relationship between the ability of the economy (firm) to innovate and how strong patent protection should be. This line of thinking runs counter to the uniÞed intellectual property regime, as introduced by TRIPS.

Keywords: Intellectual property; sequential innovation; tournaments. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K0 O11 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2004-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-law and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bri:uobdis:04/566

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