Budgetary Separation of Powers in the American States and the Tax Level: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis

Lucas Ferrero () and Leandro de Magalhaes ()

Bristol Economics Discussion Papers from School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK

Abstract: A political regime has budgetary separation of powers if the power with the prerogative to raise taxes is not the full residual claimant of a tax increase. In the American states two conditions are needed: the governor must have the line item veto, and the political interests of the legislative majority and the governor must not be perfectly aligned. Political alignment between the executive and the legislative depends on the numbers of seats the governor's party controls in the state legislature; it changes discontinuously as we move from a unifed to a divided government. We use regression discontinuity design to establish a causal relation between a divided government and lower tax rates in states with line item veto. In states with block veto such relation is not present. We estimate the jump in the tax level at the discontinuity semiparametrically.

Keywords: Separation of powers; line item veto; tax level; regression discontinuity; semiparametric. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H00 H11 H20 H30 H71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2008-05
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bri:uobdis:08/603

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