Coordination of Humanitarian Aid

Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka and In-Uck Park

Bristol Economics Discussion Papers from School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK

Abstract: We examine a setup where two agents allocate a fixed budget of humanitarian aid between two equally needy areas. The agents may be biased to one area which is their private information. Without communication aid is allocated inefficiently resulting in gaps and overlaps in response. Direct communication between the agents is ineffective and cannot resolve the coordination failure. We show that coordination can be improved by a mediator, such as an information management system, which filters the information communicated by the agents. Our results can throw light on how to improve the current disaster management systems.

Keywords: coordination; humanitarian aid; public goods; cheap talk; mediated communication; information management system. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 H41 H84 L31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages.
Date: 2017-12-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bri:uobdis:17/691

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