Can Endogenously Chosen Institutions Mitigate the Free-Rider Problem and Reduce Perverse Punishment?

Arhan Ertan, Talbot Page and Louis Putterman

No 2005-13, Working Papers from Brown University, Department of Economics

Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cwa and nep-soc
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