Sending Information to Interactive Receivers Playing a Generalized Prisoners Dilemma

Kfir Eliaz and Roberto Serrano

No 2010-16, Working Papers from Brown University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Consider the problem of information disclosure for a planner who faces two agents interacting in a state-dependent multi-action prisoners?dilemma. We ?nd conditions under which the planner can make use of his superior information by disclosing some of it to the agents, and conditions under which such information leakage is not possible. Although the problem is entirely symmetric, the planner?s only way to reveal part of the information is based on creating asymmetries between the two agents by giving them di§erent pieces of information. We also ? nd conditions under which such partially informative equilibria are the planner?s best equilibria.

Keywords: Information Disclosure; Generalized Prisoners Dilemma; Uninformative Equilibria; Partially or Fully Informative Equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners’ dilemma (2014)
Working Paper: Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bro:econwp:2010-16

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