Reducing Frictions in College Admissions: Evidence from the Common Application

Brian Knight and Nathan Schiff

No 2020-01, Working Papers from Brown University, Department of Economics

Abstract: College admissions is decentralized, creating frictions that limit student choice. We study the Common Application (CA) platform, under which students submit a single application to member schools, reducing frictions and increasing student choice. Joining the CA increases the number of applications received by schools, reflecting a reduction in frictions. Joining also reduces the yield on accepted students, reflecting increased choice. The CA also increases out-of-state enrollment, especially from other CA states, consistent with network effects. Finally, joining the CA increases freshmen SAT scores. Given that CA members tend to be selective, the CA has contributed to stratification in higher education.

Date: 2020
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Related works:
Journal Article: Reducing Frictions in College Admissions: Evidence from the Common Application (2022)
Working Paper: Reducing Frictions in College Admissions: Evidence from the Common Application (2019)
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