A Principal-Agent Relationship with No Advantage to Commitment

Rajiv Vohra, Francisco Espinosa and Debraj Ray

No 2021-003, Working Papers from Brown University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper explores conditions under which the ability to commit in a principal-agent relationship creates no additional benefit for the principal, over and above simultaneous interaction without commitment. A central assumption is that the principal’s payoff depends only on the payoff to the agent and her type.

Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bro:econwp:2021-003

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