Signaling, Screening, and Core Stability

Yusuke Kamishiro, Rajiv Vohra and Roberto Serrano

No 2022-001, Working Papers from Brown University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper provides a noncooperative approach to core stability in an economy with incomplete information. We study the perfect Bayesian equilibria of an extensive form mechanism that extends the one used by Serrano and Vohra (1997) to implement the core of a complete-information economy. This leads to a version of the core that we refer to as the sequential core, which allows for information flows through proposals that can be viewed as signaling devices and/or screening contracts. Equilibrium refinements are then used to provide justifications for the coarse core and the fine core.

Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
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Journal Article: Signaling, screening, and core stability (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bro:econwp:2022-001

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