Determinants of Employment in the Ministerial Bureaucracy

Thomas Braendle ()
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Thomas Braendle: University of Basel

Working papers from Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel

Abstract: Senior officials in the ministerial bureaucracy are responsible for the coordination of public service activity and their number has grown enormously since World War II. We study the growth in employment of this politically sensitive high-profile occupational group from a political economics perspective. We analyze how political partisanship, political patronage after changes in government, and the selection of public servants into politics affect senior official employment. Based on a unique time-series, cross-sectional data set for the German Laender, we find mixed evidence for the effect that the political selection of public servants has on senior official employment. We find some evidence for political patronage.

Keywords: political selection; public servants; public-sector growth; bureaucracy; patronage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H11 H72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2012/01

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