Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention

Patrick Balles (patrick.balles@unibas.ch), Ulrich Matter (ulrich.matter@unibas.ch) and Alois Stutzer
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Patrick Balles: University of Basel
Ulrich Matter: University of Basel

Working papers from Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel

Abstract: We examine whether representatives are more likely to serve long-term campaign donors instead of constituents during times of low media attention to politics. Based on 425 roll calls between 2005 and 2014 in the US House of Representatives, we show that representatives are more likely to vote with special interests and against constituency interests when the two are in conflict. Importantly, the latter effect is significantly larger when there is less attention on politics due to exogenous newsworthy events. The opportunistic behavior seems not to be mediated by short-term scheduling of sensitive votes right after distracting events.

Keywords: Attention; campaign finance; interest groups; legislative voting; mass media; roll call voting; US House of Representatives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 L82 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-04-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention (2024)
Working Paper: Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention (2024)
Working Paper: Special Interest Groups versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention (2018)
Working Paper: Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2020/06

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