Transfer Pricing Policy and the Intensity of Tax Rate Competition

Johannes Becker and Clemens Fuest

No 930, Working Papers from Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation

Abstract: This note provides a novel argument why countries may have incentives to allow for some profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions. The reason is that a tightening of transfer pricing policies by high tax countries leads to more agressive tax rate competition by low tax countries.

Keywords: Corporate Taxation; Profit Shifting; Tax Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 H25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-mic, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Transfer pricing policy and the intensity of tax rate competition (2012)
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