The Burning Coalition Bargaining Model

Marco Rogna

No BEMPS69, BEMPS - Bozen Economics & Management Paper Series from Faculty of Economics and Management at the Free University of Bozen

Abstract: The paper presents a coalitional bargaining model with a peculiar type of partial breakdown: the Burning Coalition Bargaining Model. Rather than triggering the end of all negotiations or the exclusion of some players from the game, as already proposed in the literature, in this model the rejection of a proposal causes the possibility of the proposed coalition to vanish. Under this type of partial breakdown and adopting a standard rejecter-proposes protocol, 0-normalized, 3-players games are examined for extreme values of the breakdown probability. When such probability is equal to one, efficiency is more difficult to obtain than in models adopting discounting. Furthermore, when an efficient outcome is attained, the final pay-offs distribution reflects the strength of players in the game, with strength being defined by belonging to more valuable coalitions. The same feature is retained when considering a probability of breakdown approaching zero.

Keywords: Bargaining Theory; Bargaining protocols; Coalition formation; Efficiency; Partial breakdown. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: [34 pages]
Date: 2020-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: The Burning Coalition Bargaining Model (2022)
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