Systèmes de rémunération des médecins et incitations à la prévention

Carine Franc and Romain Lesur

Revue économique, 2004, vol. 55, issue 5, 901-922

Abstract: This article provides an analysis of the consequences of the different remuneration schemes in terms of incentives for the physician to realize some secondary prevention. Indeed, the provision of prevention depends on the trade-off of the physician between time granted to curative practice and time granted to preventive practice. According to the intuition, the capitation system to remunerate the curative cares gives to the physician more incentives to provide prevention as she takes into account the long-term effects of prevention. We also use our model to evaluate the impact of different processes aiming to reduce the loss of information between physicians (electronic medical records). Classification JEL : I18

JEL-codes: I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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