 Quelle place pour les incitations dans la gestion du personnel enseignant ?Françoise Larré and Jean-Michel Plassard Recherches économiques de Louvain, 2008, vol. 74, issue 3, 359-403 Abstract: Abstract In the era of the economy of knowledge and learning, education has become a major issue and teacher has become a very important variable in the process of producing education. Incentives as performance-pay for teachers are frequently suggested as a way of improving teacher performance and educational outcomes in schools, but the empirical evidence to date on its effectiveness is mixed. This paper offers a review of both the theoretical and empirical literature on education experiment and reforms that alter the incentives that teachers face. Arguments for and against teacher incentives are studied. In particular, we examine i) the difficulty in monitoring and evaluation teacher performance, ii) the specific issue of team production in a context of rewarding individual teacher performance and iii) the multi-tasks problem when only some of which are measured and incentivized. JEL Classification: I21, I28, J33, J45, M52. Keywords: performance pay; teacher incentives; evaluation; group and individual incentives; multi-tasks (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:reldbu:rel_743_0359 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Recherches économiques de Louvain from De Boeck Université |
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