The Restructuring and Privatisation of British Rail: Was it really that bad?
Michael Pollitt and
Andrew Smith
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
Abstract:
Following the government’s decision to place Railtrack into administration (October 2001), attention has focused on what went wrong with privatisation, and how crucial network investment will be financed in future. This paper uses a social cost-benefit analysis framework to assess whether the restructuring and privatisation of British Rail has produced savings in operating costs. The paper shows that major efficiencies have been achieved, consumers have benefited through lower prices, whilst the increased government subsidy has been largely recouped through privatisation proceeds. We find that output quality has also improved (pre-Hatfield). The achievement of further savings will be key to delivering improved rail services in the future. This paper finds that a privatised structure, where shareholders demand a return on their investment, has led to significant improvements in operating efficiency - it remains to be seen whether the new regime, with a not-for-profit infrastructure owner, will deliver the same efficiency improvements.
Keywords: Cost benefit analysis; railway; privatisation and restructuring; efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H43 L92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37
Date: 2001-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
Note: IO
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:0118
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