Regulation, Competition and Investment in the German Electricity Market: RegTP or REGTP

Gert Brunekreeft and Sven Twelemann

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: The German energy industries will be subjected to regulation of network access enforced by a sector-specific regulator. Whereas the gas industry broke the regime of negotiated third party access, in electricity nTPA ‘worked’, although it clearly resulted in a margin squeeze. The government currently discusses whether to use rate-of-return or incentive regulation, to allow ex-ante approval of charges, and the length of the regulatory lag. Close examination suggests that generation capacity still is adequate, but in the longer term there is reason to be alert. The regulatory changes and emission trading system can both contribute to retain supply security by increasing investment.

Keywords: regulation; competition; emission trading; gas; electricity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L42 L43 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33
Date: 2005-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-eec, nep-ene, nep-net and nep-reg
Note: CMI, IO
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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