A Note on the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Discontinuous Payoffs
J. Rupert J. Gatti
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
Abstract:
This paper generalises the approach taken by Dasgupta & Maskin (1986) and Simon (1989) and provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in games with continuous strategy spaces and discontinuous payoff functions. The conditions can be applied widely, and examples for existence of pure strategy and monotonic equilibria in First-Price auctions are provided. The conditions are also appropriate for ensuring that computer generated equilibrium solutions can be extended to continuous strategy spaces.
Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Discontinuous Payoff Function; First-price Auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 2005-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: ET
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:0510
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