Beyond Regulation

Stephen Littlechild

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: The ‘standard model’ of electricity reform has been refined in many countries but not extended to others. Government is supplanting the role of regulation. Revised calculations suggest that the benefits of UK electricity privatisation were higher than previously estimated and more widely shared with consumers. Other calculations suggest that generation market power in the US is less than previously estimated by Lerner index calculations. Unduly tight price controls explain why there has been less customer switching in some residential electricity markets. There has been significant development of fixed price contracts in Nordic markets, posing questions for regulation in the absence of retail competition. There are alternatives to regulation of network monopolies. In Australia regulated interconnectors have been less economic than merchant interconnectors. In Argentina arrangements for users to determine transmission expansions have worked well. In Florida negotiated settlements have secured a better deal for customers than regulation.

Keywords: : regulation; competition; electricity; transmission (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
Date: 2006-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene, nep-ind and nep-mic
Note: IO
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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http://www.electricitypolicy.org.uk/pubs/wp/eprg0516.pdf (application/pdf)

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Chapter: Beyond regulation (2007)
Working Paper: Beyond Regulation (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:0616

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