Incentive Regulation of Electricity Distribution Networks: Lessons of Experience from Britain

Tooraj Jamasb and Michael Pollitt

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: This paper reviews the recent experience of the UK electricity distribution sector under incentive regulation. The UK has a significant and transparent history in implementing incentive regulation in the period since 1990. We demonstrate the successes of this period in reducing costs, prices and energy losses while maintaining quality of service. We also draw out the lessons for other countries in implementing distribution sector reform. We conclude by discussing the place of incentive regulation of networks within the wider reform context, the required legislative framework, the need for appropriate unbundling, the importance of quality of service incentives, the regulatory information requirements and the role of sector rationalisation.

Keywords: Electricity; liberalisation; regulation; benchmarking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L52 L94 Q48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29
Date: 2007-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-ene, nep-his and nep-reg
Note: Ec
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (109)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Incentive regulation of electricity distribution networks: Lessons of experience from Britain (2007)
Working Paper: Incentive Regulation of Electricity Distribution Networks: Lessons of Experience from Britain (2007)
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