Give and Take: Political Competition, Participation and Public Finance in 20th Century Latin America

Toke Aidt and Dalibor Eterovic

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: Rational choice models predict that political competition and political participation have opposite effects on the size of government. We investigate these theories using data from a panel of 18 Latin American countries during the 20th century. Our research builds evidence for the prediction that reforms enhancing political competition tend to limit the size of government, while reforms increasing political participation tend to increase the size of government. Furthermore, we find that reforms which remove literacy requirements from franchise laws are associated with governmental expansion, while changes in women.s su¤rage laws have no impact on the size of government. Our findings demonstrate the empirical relevance of the distinction between political competition and participation.

Keywords: Political competition, political participation, the extension of the franchise, women.s su¤rage, literacy requirements; size of government; school enrollment. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29
Date: 2007-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dev, nep-his, nep-lam, nep-pbe and nep-pol
Note: Ec
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:0714

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