Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: the Multi-Agent Case with Transferable Utility

Robert Evans and Sönje Reich

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: Bester and Strausz (2000) showed that the revelation principle of Bester and Strausz (2001) does not apply in a setting of many agents and no commitment. In their counterexample only one agent has private information. We show that if the parties can make ex ante transfers the revelation principle does extend to this setting. However, we show that it does not extend to a setting in which more than one agent has private information.

Keywords: Revelation Principle; Commitment; Asymmetric Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29
Date: 2007-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-upt
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Journal Article: Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case with transferable utility (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:0731

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