Electoral Uncertainty and Public Goods

Toke Aidt and Jayasri Dutta ()

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: This paper argues that uncertain or random voter turnout plays a key role in mediating conflicts of interest between voters and politicians on the one hand and heterogenous groups of voters on the other. Random voter turnout creates an incentive for politicians to seek con- sensus because it is unclear ex ante who will hold the majority among those who turn out to vote. We argue that this leads to efficient provision of public goods and that it protects minority groups against the tyranny of the majority. We also argue that compulsory voting may not be desirable because it reduces randomness in turnouts.

Keywords: Political Agency; Performance Voting; Turnout Uncertainty; Public Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://files.econ.cam.ac.uk/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe0843.pdf Working Paper Version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:0843

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jake Dyer ().