The Supply Function Equilibrium and its Policy Implications for Wholesale Electricity Auctions

Pär Holmberg and David M Newbery

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: The supply function equilibrium provides a game-theoretic model of strategic bidding in oligopolistic wholesale electricity auctions. This paper presents an intuitive account of current understanding and shows how welfare losses depend on the number of firms in the market and their asymmetry. Previous results and general recommendations for divisible-good/multi-unit auctions provides guidance on the design of the auction format, setting the reservation price, the rationing rule, and restrictions on the offer curves in wholesale electricity auctions.

Keywords: Wholesale electricity markets; supply function equilibria; auction design; competition policy; market regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D43 D44 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-reg
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (53)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/pub ... pe-pdfs/cwpe1016.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: The supply function equilibrium and its policy implications for wholesale electricity auctions (2010)
Working Paper: The supply function equilibrium and its policy implications for wholesale electricity auctions (2010)
Working Paper: The Supply Function Equilibrium and Its Policy Implications for Wholesale Electricity Auctions (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:1016

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jake Dyer ().