Reforming Small Power Systems under Political Volatility: The Case of Nepal
Rabindra Nepal and
Tooraj Jamasb
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
Abstract:
This paper assesses the electricity sector reforms across small power systems while citing Nepal as an example. The on-going political instability and increasing electricity demand make power sector reform in Nepal and similar small systems a more complex process. As international reform experiences provide plenty of lessons to learn; raising electricity tariffs and adjusting subsidies in the presence of an effective regulation body are important in the short and medium term. The creation of an effective regulatory commission is also more urgent than unbundling the sector in smaller systems though accounting separation may sometimes be desirable as in the present context in Nepal. In the long run as the system grows, vertical separation and competitive privatisation may be pursued together with the creation of a functioning wholesale market by horizontally splitting the generation segments.
Keywords: Electricity reform; small systems; political instability; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L52 L94 Q48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-04-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa, nep-ene and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Reforming Small Power Systems Under Political Volatility: The Case of Nepal (2011) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:1133
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