To Ban or Not to Ban: Foreign Lobbying and Cross National Externalities

Toke Aidt and Uk Hwang

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: This paper studies the costs and benefits of foreign lobbying. We show how and when foreign lobbying can help internalize cross national externalities. We argue that this is an often overlooked benefit of foreign lobbying. We also study under what conditions a constitutional rule banning foreign lobbying is in the national interest of a country. A key factor in this calculus is whether the interests of foreign lobby groups and domestic unorganized groups coincide or not. We illustrate the logic with examples from trade policy and environmental regulation.

JEL-codes: D62 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-01-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-int and nep-pol
Note: tsa23
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Related works:
Journal Article: To Ban or Not to Ban: Foreign Lobbying and Cross-National Externalities (2014)
Journal Article: To Ban or Not to Ban: Foreign Lobbying and Cross‐National Externalities (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:1402

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