Discrimination, Social Identity, and Coordination: An Experiment

Vessela Daskalova ()

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: This paper presents an experiment investigating the effect of social identity on hiring decisions. The question is whether people discriminate between own and other group candidates. Key features of the experimentare: First, to consider whether they do so in individual, as well as in joint decisions; Second, to document whether the identity of the co-decisionmaker matters in joint decisions. Substantial discrimination occurs in both individual and joint decision-making situations. In joint decisions,decision makers discriminate when deciding with someone from their own group, but not when deciding with someone from the other group.

Keywords: social identity; discrimination; favoritism; coordination; experimental evidence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D84 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-04-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-exp
Note: vrd22
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https://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/pub ... pe-pdfs/cwpe1555.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Discrimination, social identity, and coordination: An experiment (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:1555

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